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Seegers Lecture
PUBLIC REASON, ABORTION, AND CLONING
JOHN FINNIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Every society, liberal or illiberal, takes a public stand on the question
whether abortion is or is not a form of criminal activity. If that question were
left to private judgment, people who judge it homicide would be entitled to use
force to prevent their fellow citizens engaging in it (just as they are entitled to
use force to prevent infanticide, or sexual intercourse between adults and 8-year-
old children).
The need for the law and public policy to take a stand has become more
and more obvious for two reasons. The first has to do with the standard
purpose of abortion, as that term is commonly used: to end the life of a
fetus/unborn child. As Jeffrey Reiman argues in his new book, Critical Moral
Liberalism: Theory and Practice,' the right to abortion which he is interested
in defending, and which many others are interested in having, is a right which
would be negated if it were reduced to "[a woman's] right to expel an
unwelcome fetus from her body, and only to end its life if necessary for the
expulsion."2 The right which Reiman and so many others defend is the right
precisely to kill the unwelcome fetus. The significance of this is made clear by
the second reason: unborn children who are welcome, and who are thought to
be in danger, can nowadays be the beneficiaries of elaborate therapeutic
attentions. From a month or so after conception, their condition, their
individual appearance and characteristics, their every movement, can be clearly
seen and followed on the ultrasound screen; their medical problems can be and
. D. Phil., Oxford University, 1965; LL.B., University of Adelaide, 1961; Professor of Law
and Legal Philosophy, Oxford University; Biolchini Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
Seegers Lecture, Valparaiso University School of Law, November 13, 1997.
1. JEFFREY H. REIMAN, CRITICAL MORAL LIBERALISM: THEORY AND PRAcrnCE 190 (1997).
2. Reiman goes on to say that unless the right to abortion includes the right to get the fetus
dead:
As early as a living fetus can be safely and easily removed from a pregant woman, her
right to abortion might be transformed into a duty to provide extrauterine care for her
expelled fetus. If (when!) medical technology pushes this point back towards the earliest
moments of pregnancy, the right to abortion will disappear entirely.
Id. (emphasis added).
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very frequently are attended to in much the same way as after their birth.
Medical practitioners engaged in such activities routinely say and think that they
have two patients. And it is obvious to everyone that any medical practitioners
who took advantage of this sort of opportunity to kill an unborn child (without
the request of the mother), pursuant to some private policy of (say) killing Jews
or the children of atheists, would be ethically and should be legally liable to
some plausible charge of homicide or something savoring of homicide (say, the
"great misprision" of abortion-as the seventeenth and eighteenth century
textbooks of English and therefore American criminal law put it).3 Minimally,
any society, liberal or not, in which the difference between the unborn, the
partially born, and the newborn is, for practical purposes, no more (and no
less!) than the difference between being (wholly or partly) inside and outside the
mother's body must, and will, publicly regulate the ways in which medical
practitioners and others deal with the unborn (or partially born), and particularly
those dealings which by intention or negligence result in the death of the unborn
(or partially unborn).
Interestingly, much the same conclusion must be reached (I shall argue)
about proposals to engage in initiating the life of an unborn person by cloning.
II. JOHN RAWLS, PUBLIC REASON, AND THOMAS AQUINAS
The term "public reason" has recently been introduced into political
theoretical discourse by John Rawls, and he chooses to illustrate his use of the
term by reference to the issue of the regulation of abortion. Rawls's remarks
about abortion do not, perhaps, show his work to best advantage. But it will be
worth making our own exploration of the question of whether "public reason"
is a concept or nest of concepts worth adopting into legal and political theory,
using abortion and/or cloning as test cases whenever our exploration would be
advanced by carrying out a test.
3. As Reiman says, "it is so natural to us to think this way," namely, of the fetus "as a
personlike victim-which is a moral status that a not-yet-existing fetus lacks." Id. at 195. This in
turn is tightly linked to the assumption, which Reiman grants and perhaps even concedes, that "the
being that traverses the span from cohception to death is a self-identical individual. That is a more
or less natural extension of the common belief that a human being from birth to death is a self-
identical individual-the one named by its proper name." Id. at 194.
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I should say at the outset that the attractions of the term "public reason"
have not been much diminished for me by the discovery that Rawls's own usage
(as almost everyone agrees) is confused and arbitrary. "Public reason" seems
to me quite a good phrase for summarily conveying the gist of several features4
of classical political thought as expounded by (say) Thomas Aquinas:5
(1) The proper function of the state's law and government is limited. In
particular, its role is not (as Aristotle had supposed) to make people integrally
good but only to maintain peace and justice in inter-personal relationships.6 In
this respect, the public realm, the res publica, is different from certain other
associations such as family and church, associations which, albeit with limited
means, can properly aspire to bring it about that their members become
integrally good people. As Rawls says, "public reason" is contrasted not with
"private reason"-"there is no such thing as private reason" 7-but with the
ways of deliberating appropriate to all nonpublic associations, i.e., all
associations other than the political community.' The deliberations of the
political community as such-that is, of its rulers, including voters, as
such-proceed in the appropriate way only if they are concerned to determine
those requirements of justice and peace which Aquinas regularly names "public
good. "I
4. To the three I mention, I might add:
Any activity is to be pursued in a way appropriate to its purpose. . . . One sort of
academic disputation is designed to remove doubts about whether such-and-such is so.
In disputations of this sort you should above all use authorities acceptable to those with
whom you are disputing. . . . And if you are disputing with people who accept no
authority, you must resort to natural reasons.
THOMAS AQUINAS, QUODLIBETAL QUESTIONS IV q. 9 a. 3c (emphasis added).
5. See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY (1998).
6. Aquinas argued:
[K]ings are constituted to preserve inter-personal social life (ad socialem vitam inter
homines conservandam); that is why they are called 'public persons', as if to say
promoters or guardians of public good. And for that reason, the laws they make direct
people in their relationships with other people (secundum quod ad alios ordinantur).
Those things, therefore, which neither advance nor damage the common good are
neither prohibited nor commanded by human laws.
THOMAS AQUINAS, OPERA OMNIA, vol. 14, p. 46* col. 1. See also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE I-II q. 96 a. 3c; q. 98 a. lc; q. 100 a. 2c. [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE].
7. This needs qualification if and only to the extent that there are private revelations from God.
So the Catholic faith claims that its own teaching is a matter of public reason, inasmuch as it is a
matter of public, not private revelation. See the claim made in Peter's preaching in Jerusalem (Acts
2:22), in Paul's in Athens (Acts 17:31), and SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, LUMEN GENTIUM § 25
(1964), translated in VATICAN COUNCIL II 381 (Austin P. Flannery ed., 1975).
8. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 220 (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
9. See FINNIS, supra note 5, at 226.
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(2) In determining and enforcing the requirements of public good, the
state's law-makers and other rulers (including voters) are entitled to impose as
requirements only those practical principles which are accessible to all people
whatever their present religious beliefs or cultural practices. These are the
principles (communia principia rationis practicae)"' called in the tradition
"natural law," on the understanding that they are "natural" because, and only
because, they are rational-requirements of being practically reasonable-and
thus accessible to beings whose nature includes rational capacities.
(3) The central case of government is the rule of a free people, and the
central case of law is coordination of willing subjects by law which, by its fully
public character (promulgation)," clarity, 2  generality, 3  stability, 4  and
practicability, 5 treats them as partners in public reason.'
6
III. POLMCAL LIBERALISM AND PUBLIC REASON:
RAWLS'S UNCIVIL AND UNREASONABLE THESIS
The central tenet of Rawls's construct "Political Liberalism," in his 1993
book Political Liberalism, is "the liberal principle of legitimacy."'" Political
questions which concern or border on constitutional essentials or basic questions
of justice will be settled fully and properly only if settled by principles and
ideals that all citizens "may reasonably be expected to endorse"-such principles
and ideals are named by Rawls "public reason(s) and [public] justification."' 8
The whole point of the principle of legitimacy is to rule out as illegitimate, in
a certain context, certain principles and ideals and in general theses, even though
they are or may well be true-i.e., to rule them out on grounds completely
distinct from their falsity or their unreasonableness judged
"comprehensively." 19
10. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II q. 94 a. 4c.
11. Id. at -II q. 90 a. 4c.
12. Id. at I-IT q. 95 a. 3c (laws lacking clarity in expression [mnanifestatio] are harmful).
3. Id. at I-I q. 96 a. 1.
14. Id. at I-II q. 97 a. 2c.
15. Id. at I-II q. 95 a. 3c (disciplina conveniens unicuique secundum suam possibilitatem).
16. Aquinas thus pointed to all the main features of the Rule of Law. See LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 242 (1969).
17. RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 137.
18. Id. at 137 (emphasis added); see also id. at 217.
19. Very often Rawls states the principle of legitimacy expansively, so that it outlaws not only
using public coercive power on certain (i.e., nonpublic) grounds, but also outlaws the appeal to such
grounds in all political discussion (at least of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice)
even on the part of those who wish to resist that sort of use of public power. Id. at 138, 153, 214-
15. This expansion seems to me inevitable, for if the legitimacy principle sieved out political theses
only when and because they demand the use of public power (as Rawls often suggests when setting
up his legitimacy principle and trying to make it palatable), it would in many cases result only in
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Rawls's formulations of the legitimacy principle are remarkably ambiguous.
When one says of a thesis, "all may reasonably be expected to endorse it," is
one piedicting the behavior of people or assessing the rational strength of the
thesis? Does one mean that reasonable observers will agree that practically all
citizens will (or at least are likely to) endorse it? Or does one make a judgment
about the grounds, evidence or reasons for and against the thesis and thus about
the (un)reasonableness of any refusal to endorse it?
There is evidence in favor of the predictive, external-viewpoint reading.
For example, Rawls says of a particular thesis that, even though it may be true,
"reasonable persons are bound to differ uncompromisingly" about it.' The
phrase "are bound to" seems fairly clearly (though it too is elusive!) to be in the
predictive mode, not the mode of speech of someone assessing the thesis itself
as reasonable or unreasonable. 2
But the external-viewpoint interpretation obviously entails a particularly
gross form of veto, by majorities or indeed by minorities. So it is not too
surprising that there is also plenty of textual evidence in favor of a normative,
a grotesque free-for-all of private power. Take abortion: one thesis says that public power should
be used to prevent the aborting of (say) healthy children in healthy mothers; if we reject that as
illegitimate just because it seeks the use of public power, we still confront the thesis of those who
say that public power should be used to prevent abortion rescuers who seek to use their private
power to stop the killing of fetuses just as they would try to stop the killing of -infants; if we rule
out this thesis because it too seeks to harness public power, we are left with a sheer power struggle
between the abortionists and the rescuers. And as a matter of fact, quite appropriately Rawls's own
discussion of what theses are legitimate in relation to abortion makes no reference to the use of
public power, but only to the substantive facts and political values (life, equality, nature of early as
opposed to late pregnancy, and so forth: id. at 243).
20. Id. at 138 (emphasis added). Note, incidentally, the tension between Rawls's approval of
"uncompromising" refusal to endorse certain religious opinions, here, and his statement earlier that
"[p]olitical liberalism starts by taking to heart the absolute depth of th[e] irreconcilable latent
conflict" which is introduced when a salvationist, creedal, and expansionist religion "introduces into
people's conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting of compromise." Id. at
xxviii. In reality, a "transcendent element not admitting of compromise" is in no way peculiar to
such religions.
21. Notice: if reasonable persons are differing about this thesis uncompromisingly, they must
think that their own position endorsing or withholding their endorsement from it is correct. If they
are modest objectivists, they will each hold that under ideal epistemic conditions-"favourable
conditions of investigation" and reflection (JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHics 64 (1983),
citing David Wiggins, Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life, 62 PRoc. BRIT. ACAD. 331 (1977))
-reasonable people would agree with their affirmation (or denial); for (i) that is entailed by the
ordinary concept of truth which modest objectivists simply unpack, and (ii) that is also the
presupposition on which people engage in reasonable debate with each other (assuming that they are
not mere propagandists willing to use any and every rhetorical device to win non-rational
endorsements of the theses for which they are "arguing"). (So this quasi- (ideal case) prediction,
unlike Rawls's apparent prediction of disagreement, is really based upon a normative, internal
assessment of the rational grounds for endorsing (affirming) or denying the thesis.)
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internal-viewpoint of Rawls's own legitimacy principle, such that "can
reasonably be expected to endorse" thesis X is to be read as signifying a
judgment on the sorts of grounds there are for endorsing or denying X.'
Particularly interesting is the passage where Rawls finally faces up to "rationalist
believers" in a "comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine" who
"contend that their beliefs are open to and can be fully established by reason"
and are "so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justifies civil
strife."23 Having curiously suggested that this view is uncommon-when
actually it is (in some form) the claim of the entire central tradition of natural
law theory in philosophy and theology-Rawls interprets the rationalist believers'
claim as a denial of "what we have called 'thd fact of reasonable pluralism.'"4
But their claim could not be a denial of that "fact" unless the so-called fact of
reasonable pluralism is in the same logical field as the rationalist believers'
claim that their beliefs can be fully established by reason. And Rawls's recipe
for dealing with the rationalist believers is to claim, not that others do not in fact
agree with them, but rather that they are "mistaken" in thinking that their beliefs
can be "publicly and fully established by reason"-a claim that cannot
reasonably be made by Rawls without looking, in what I call an internal,
normative way, at the merits of the rationalist believers' arguments as
arguments.
So much then for the radical ambiguity of Rawls's principle of legitimacy.
What are Rawls's grounds for putting it forward in any of its possible senses?
The principle of legitimacy and the limits or guidelines of public reason
"have the same basis as the substantive principles of justice."26 That is, they
would be adopted by the parties in the Original Position, because those parties
would be failing their responsibility as trustees for everyone who has to live
under the principles they adopt in the Original Position, unless they adopted the
22. Consider the following passages from Political Liberalism. In the first, Rawls says,
[In discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, we are not to appeal
to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines-to what we as individuals or
members of associations see as the whole truth- . . . [but to] the plain truths now
widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 224-25 (emphasis added). In the second, Rawls
says,
[Elach of us must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and
guidelines we think other citizens . . . may reasonably be expected to endorse along
with us .... Of course, we may find that actually others fail to endorse the principles
and guidelines our criterion selects. That is to be expectedf!].
Id. at 226-27.
23. Id. at 152-53.
24. Id. at 153.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 225.
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principle that the application of the substantive principles be "guided by
judgment and inference, reasons and evidence that [everyone] can reasonably be
expected to endorse."z'
So the legitimacy thesis stands and falls with the "political constructivism"
employed in Rawls's famous 1971 book, A Theory of Justice.28 So it falls.
That book rests on a fallacious or undefended claim. It proposes that we
recognize as principles of justice those, and only those, principles which would
be adopted in a hypothetical Original Position, behind a "veil of ignorance," an
artificial ignorance and risk-aversion supposed to be characteristic of the
hypothetical parties who are to choose those principles of justice which will
apply, outside the Original Position, in the real world. We can accept that
principles which would be chosen in the Original Position would be equal and
free from bias. But we cannot assume, as Rawls simply does assume, that
principles which would not be chosen in the Original Position are therefore not
principles of justice in the real world in which we may judge them without being
hampered either by the Original Position's veil of ignorance about theoretical
and practical truths, or by a degree of risk aversion which, if not unreasonable,
is at best only one reasonable attitude among other, often less-risk-averse,
attitudes .29
Political Liberalism is a vast elaboration-and perhaps to some extent is
intended as a defense-of A Theory of Justice's basic strategy and postulate of
ignorance of value (i.e., thin theory of the good and "thick veil of
ignorance"'), a device whose entire motivation is to ensure that: (i) the
Original Position construct will yield principles in line with Rawls's settled
political opinions (what he calls the "acceptable conclusions" which a "model
of practical reason" such as the Original Position must fit on pain of being
revised or even abandoned altogether"1); and (ii) that Rawls will not have to
offer a defense of those opinions against the criticism that they ignore or
contradict certain truths about human good.
Does Political Liberalism offer any further and more satisfactory defense
of the legitimacy principle's exclusion of "nonpublic" truths and reasons from
one's public discussion and one's individual act of "voting on the most
27. Id.; see also id. at 62.
28. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE].
29. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 108-09 (1980); John M.
Finnis, Legal Enforcement of Duties to Oneself: Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 433,
435-36 (1987).
30. See RAwLs, PoLmcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 24 n.27.
31. Id. at 96 and n.8.
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fundamental political questions"?32 It seems not. No doubt Rawls intends a
defense in his remarks about "reasonable pluralism," the "ideal of democratic
citizenship," and "civility." However, all these simply assume what needs to
be shown: that it is uncivil and undemocratic to propose to one's fellow citizens
theses (on matters of fundamental justice) which one regards as true and
established by evidences or reasons available to any reasonable person willing
to consider them in an open-minded way-notwithstanding that, de facto, very
many people do reject them.
Moreover, the legitimacy principle, as stated and understood by Rawls, is
itself (I shall argue) illegitimate, uncivil, and unreasonable. It is illegitimate
because it censors truthful and reasonable public discourse
and-worse-prohibits individual resort to correct principles and criteria of
practical judgment, in relation to fundamental political questions, without any
coherent, principled reason for the prohibition. It is unreasonable because it
restricts public deliberation and individual public action precisely on those
matters where it is most important to be correct, i.e., where people's
fundamental human rights are at stake.
Consider the example which Rawls himself brings forward to illustrate how
his legitimacy principle works out in practice-in his remarks about one of the
most important of the "fundamental political' questions" currently debated:
abortion.33 Here his legitimacy thesis makes him claim (in effect) that one not
only will be mistaken but will moreover be violating one's duties of democratic
citizenship if one reasons, for example, in the following way:
Every human being is entitled to an equal right to life;' unborn
children, even in the first three months of their life, are human beings
(as any medical textbook shows); therefore unborn children are entitled
to the protection of the law against being deliberately killed even in the
first three months of their life; and so I should vote for a law or
constitutional amendment which recognizes that right.
Having asserted (by implication) that anyone who argues in such a way is not
only mistaken but also antidemocratic (and having explicitly claimed that such
a person subscribes to a doctrine which would be cruel and oppressive even if
it allowed exceptions for rape and incest), Rawls adds that any comprehensive
32. Id. at 216.
33. Id. at 243 n.32.
34. Bizarrely, this right is not one of Rawls's "principles ofjustice," and so anyone who asserts
it (as in numerous Bills of Rights, though not directly in the antique United States one) is asserting
a comprehensive, not a political, doctrine!
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doctrine which supports that reasoning "is to that extent unreasonable."35 So
he asserts not merely that pro-life arguments on the abortion question are
mistaken, but that they could not possibly be grounds for political action such
as voting. And he claims to be able to say all this without publicly discussing
the comprehensive doctrine(s) he condemns, and without shouldering the
responsibility of saying where the error in the reasoning about abortion lies.
Instead of joining in the rational debate about abortion, he side-tracks and short-
circuits it by simply declaring that "all reasonable people can be expected to
agree" that healthy, mature women have the right to kill their child during the
first three months of his or her unborn life and probably for longer. 6 So the
legitimacy principle has an effect exactly the opposite of what Rawls clearly
intended: it generates a kind of incivility of its own-heat instead of light.
Rawls's legitimacy principle is a distorted and unwarranted analogue of a
genuine principle of public reason, namely: fundamental political, constitutional,
legal questions ought to be settled according to natural right, i.e., to principles
and norms which are reasonable, using criteria of evidence and judgment that
are available to all. One reason why he overlooks this alternative is that in
thinking of the tradition, he clearly supposes that liberalism-in the first
instance, the comprehensive liberalism of Hume and Kant, and then his own
"political" liberalism-differentiated itself from the tradition by adopting two
views: (1) that knowledge of how we are to act is accessible to every person
who is "ordinar[il]y reasonable and conscientious" rather than "only to some,
or to a few (the clergy, say)"; and (2) that the moral order required of us arises
"in some way from human nature itself," say by reason, together with the
requirements of our living together in society, rather than "from an external
source, say from an order of values in God's intellect."37  He seems
completely unaware that what I shall call the tradition in fact rejected these as
false contrasts and so embraced precisely the positions he thinks characteristic
of liberalism: moral knowledge is available or accessible to all and arises in
some way from human nature and reason and the requirements of social living.
Where the tradition parts company with Rawls is in relation to his "fact of
reasonable pluralism/disagreement." When Rawls says, "It is unrealistic-or
worse, it arouses mutual suspicion and hostility-to suppose that all our
differences are rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in the rivalries
for power, status, or economic gain,"38 the tradition of natural law theorizing
says, "Let's distinguish." There are many reasonable differences which arise
from differences of sentiment, of prior commitment, and of belief about likely
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at xxviii.
38. Id. at 58.
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future outcomes. In such cases, there is no uniquely correct opinion, though
there are many incorrect opinions. But in relation to some matters, including
at least some matters of basic rights, there are correct moral beliefs, accessible
to all (even to those who in fact reject them). In relation to such matters,
differing opinions can only be rooted in ignorance or some sub-rational
influence, and it is mistaken-though this of course needs to be shown, by
rational argument-to say that there is more than one "fully reasonable"39 or
"perfectly reasonable" 40 belief. If by "perfectly reasonable" though erroneous
belief Rawls means a belief which is held without subjective moral fault in
respect of the forming of it, I would say that that is an important category of de
facto beliefs but one which would better be called, not "perfectly reasonable"
-which it quite clearly is not!-but "inculpably erroneous," blamelessly
mistaken or, in one traditional idiom, "invincibly ignorant." Public reasoning
should be directed to overcoming the relevant mistakes, and public deliberations
should be directed to avoiding them in practice-not pre-emptively surrendering
to them.
Of course, a "liberalism of fear"41 is sometimes or even quite often
warranted. It can often be morally reasonable to refrain from enforcing basic
human rights, for fear of provoking a war which one cannot win or which will
impact unfairly, as most wars do, on the weakest.
The Rawlsian version of public reason is, as I said, particularly
unreasonable because its demand-that moral truths and complicated
("elaborate") factual questions42 be excluded from public discourse and
deliberation-is made only in relation to the most important questions of justice,
such as whether it is acceptable to kill your unborn child at your choice, or
acceptable to base our nation's defense policy on a plan to, under certain
conditions, incinerate an enemy's civilian population with the side-effect of
poisoning half or more of the people of bystander nations. Such matters are
apparently to be remitted to hunches or "judgments" untested by public political
discourse about matters of principle or fact. That means they are remitted to the
status quo established by sheer power of numbers or influence, a status
quo-under-pinned by abortion on demand and anti-civilian nuclear
deterrence-with which Rawls happens, it seems, to be well satisfied "on
balance."
39. Id.
40. Id. at 24 n.27.
41. See id. at xxvi n.10.
42. Id. at 225.
370
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IV. PUBLIC REASON AND THE CHILD: RAWLS, THOMSON, AND THE COURT
Still, much remains to be said in favor of the underlying concern which
gives both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism an initial plausibility and
an appeal which survives the recognition that their central arguments are
fallacious. That concern is the concern to avoid bias, unfairness between
persons, violations of the Golden Rule. In the introduction to the paperback
edition of Political Liberalism, and his more or less contemporaneous article
"The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,"" Rawls gives a new prominence and
a new formulation to a principle intended to make full sense of the demand that
voting and other political determinations be made only by or on the basis of
"public reasons." This principle is the "criterion of reciprocity: our exercise
of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we
offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a
justification of those actions."" It is indeed the source of the liberal principle
of legitimacy,45 and thus of the conception of public reason defended by Rawls.
The reciprocity criterion's role "is to specify the nature of the political relation
in a constitutional democratic regime as one of civic friendship."46 And it is
itself the expression, or an immediate entailment, of the "intrinsic normative and
moral ideal" without which "political liberalism" and Rawls's "political
conception of justice" would fail to count as a moral conception at all (and thus
would fail to be available to guide anyone's conscientious deliberations as a
voter or other participant in governing). This ideal, Rawls says,
can be set out in this way. Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one
another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over
generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social
cooperation (defined by principles and ideals) and they agree to act on
those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular
situations, provided that others accept those terms. For these terms
to be fair terms, citizens offering them must reasonably think that
those citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably
accept them.4 7
This ideal, with its corresponding normative requirement, seems broadly
reasonable. So we can ask how it bears on the situation of children.
43. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765-807 (1997)
[hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason].
44. R.AWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at xlvi.
45. Id.
46. Id. at li.
47. Id. at xliv (emphases added).
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Would it be consistent with justice, with civic friendship, with fairness and
the- criterion of reciprocity to adopt a scheme in which infants and children
unwanted by their parents could be reared for the purposes of satisfying the
desires of pedophiles by being fed up to the age of sexual desirability in
circumstances (including euphoric drugs) such that their eventual fate was
entirely concealed from them, and on condition that after a sufficient period of
use for sexual services they would be killed painlessly, without warning, while
they slept? This is not a question of exegesis of Rawls's or anyone else's texts
("Does 'citizen' mean adult citizen?" "What does 'across generations' really
mean?" "Are the parties to the criterion of reciprocity more narrowly defined
than the parties to the Original Position?"). The question is one of substance,
and the answer to it is clear enough.
Rawls himself seems plainly to accept that infants and children get the
benefit of the criterion of reciprocity: "The fundamental political relation of
citizenship . . . is a relation of citizens within the basic structure of society, a
structure we enter only by birth and exit only by death .... 4" The dealings
of adults with infants and children must satisfy the criterion of reciprocity,49
even when doing so is "at the cost of their [the adults'] own interests in
particular situations"; such dealings cannot be justified by the plea that children
are not the equals of adults and these children will never enter the circle of free
and equal citizens because we will kill them before they do and before they
realize what we have done, or will do, to them.
This being so, the question arises why Rawls draws the boundary of justice,
fairness and reciprocity at birth. This question does not seek to settle the rights
of the mother over and against the unborn child. It is just the question of how
it could be rational to think that the child just before birth has no rights (no
status in justice, fairness, reciprocity) while the child just after birth has the
48. Id. at xlv (emphasis added).
49. See also, very clearly, RAWLS, THEORY OF JusTICE, supra note 28, at 509:
IThe minimal requirements defining moral personality refer to a capacity and not to the
realization of it. A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is yet developed, is
to receive the full protection of the principles of justice. Since infants and children are
thought to have basic rights (normally exercised on their behalf by parents and
guardians), this interpretation... seems necessary to match our considered judgments.
Moreover, regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords with the hypothetical nature
of the original position, and with the idea that as far as possible the choice of principles
should not be influenced by arbitrary contingencies. Therefore it is reasonable to say
that those who could take place in the initial agreement, were it not for fortuitous
circumstances, are assured equal justice. (emphasis added)
Well said.
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rights of a citizen free and equal to other citizens.' Why should the child a
week before birth be subject to the uttermost coercion of being destroyed at
someone else's "balancing of values" or "ordering of values" (if not sheer
whim)?
The public reason of the United States, as manifested in the loquacious
judgments of its Supreme Court, has after a quarter of a century uttered not a
sentence that even appears intended to offer a rational response to that question.
The response, rather, is of the form: "We are in charge; these are the human
beings (and other entities, such as corporations) we-by our Constitution-have
chosen, or now choose, to protect and those are not." Save in its phrasing, the
United States Supreme Court's neglect of its responsibility to offer public
reasons has been as truculent as that.5' (This refusal has been made possible
partly by the position of minority Justices such as Justice Antonin Scalia, who
for clearly inadequate reasons would leave to the states the fundamental question
of who is and who is not entitled to the protection of the United States
Constitution's guarantees against deprivation of life without due process of law.)
The failure of public reason in action is made all the more obvious by the
position of the German Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly held-albeit
without following through consistently-that the constitutional right to protection
of life is enjoyed by the unborn human being from the time of conception.
Rawls says that the outcome of the vote on the abortion question "is to be
seen as reasonable provided all citizens of a reasonably just constitutional regime
sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason."52 The decisive
votes on this question have been conducted among the fifteen or so Justices
involved in Roe,5 3 Webster,' and Casey."5  Do the pro-abortion votes of
50. As Jeffrey Reiman says (though with his own intent!), a decent moral-political theory "must
remain open to the possibility that as-yet-unrecognized forms of unjustified coercion may be
discovered and that new rights"-he means legal, recognized rights-"may be needed to defend
freedom against them." REIMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
51. The open unreasonableness is encapsulated in the statement by the Court in Roe v. Wade
that "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins," followed by statements and
rulings which presuppose and indeed assert that before birth the child's life is merely "the
potentiality of human life." 410 U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973). The same pretense of agnosticism is
maintained in Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
[Abortion] is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman. .. ; for the
persons who perform... ; for the spouse, family and society which must confront the
knowledge that these procedures exist[!], procedures which some deem [!] nothing short
of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for
the life or potential life that is aborted.
505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
52. RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at lvi.
53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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these citizens satisfy the requirement of being cast "sincerely ... in accordance
with the idea of public reason," in Rawls' restrictive sense of that term? I
cannot think of any evidence that they were.56 The anti-abortion arguments
they faced were founded squarely on claims about the human and personal
nature and status of the unborn, i.e., about the absence of any significant
difference between unborn and newborn. Those claims, none of them more
controversial than the rival claims about the moral rights of privacy or liberty,
are not substantially addressed, even for a sentence or two, in any of the pro-
abortion judgments in those cases. Addressing them would not have involved
moving from public to non-public reason. A doctrine which says (as Rawls and
the pro-abortion Justices say) "children must be treated as equal to adults in
basic constitutional rights applicable to their situation from the day of their
birth" is no less "comprehensive" and no more "public" than one that says
"children must be treated as equal to adults in basic constitutional rights
applicable to their situation even before birth."
By pointing to an argument by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rawls in his recent
work 7 tries to give the status "reasonable" to pro-abortion views which are in
fact unreasonable. Thomson's Rawlsian argument runs:
First, restrictive regulation [of abortion] severely constrains women's
liberty. Second, severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in
the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable
in rejecting. And third, the many women who reject the claim that the
fetus has a right to life from the moment of conception are not
unreasonable in doing so. 8
55. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56. And I heard on the radio a set of remarks in which the speaker, said by the BBC to be
Justice Powell, explained that his vote in Roe v. Wade was cast on the basis of what he felt he would
want for his daughter if she were pregnant. This is in line with remarks made by Justice Powell in
1979 in an interview with Harry M. Clor, which seem utterly indifferent to the demands of the
criterion of reciprocity:
The concept of liberty was the underlying principle of the abortion case-the liberty to
make certain highly personal decisions that are terribly important to people .... It is
difficult to think of a decision that's more personal or more important to a pregnant
woman than whether or not she will bear a child.
DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE
V. WADE, 576 (1994). Like the Court's opinion in Casey, which on the point in issue says little
more but in many more words, this is simply a diaphanously veiled appeal to power regardless of
questions of justice. It is difficult to think of a decision that is less merely personal, and more
important to another person, than the decision to kill that person.
57. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at Ivi n.31; see also Rawls, Public Reason,
supra note 43, at 798 n.80.
58. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Abortion, 20 BOSTON REV. 11, 15 (1995).
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The whole point of this argument, as Thomson makes clear, is to gain its
conclusion without contesting the central anti-abortion claims that unborn
children have a right not to be intentionally or unjustly killed and a right to the
equal protection of the laws against homicide.5 9 The argument fails to meet its
objective. In the admitted absence of an argument to show that in these precise
respects the unborn are in different case from (say) the newly-born, the position
of the many women who reject the claim that the fetus has a right to life is
indeed unreasonable. The fact that these many women, or some of them, are
otherwise reasonable in no way establishes that this position of theirs is
reasonable or in accordance with public reason. As Rawls says, just as "a
comprehensive doctrine is not as such unreasonable because it leads to an
unreasonable conclusion in one or even in several cases," 6' so a person is not
disentitled to the description "a reasonable person" just because she adopts an
unreasonable position in one or even several cases (especially cases which so
obviously engage her self-interest or other special emotional sources of bias).6
Having claimed that a majority decision which authorizes the free killing
of the unborn "is to be seen as reasonable" and "binding on citizens by the
majority principle," even if it is fallacious and erroneous and is thus a denial of
basic justice, Rawls goes on to make several claims about anti-abortion citizens
(prejudicially called by him "Catholics"):
[1] [T]hey need not exercise the right of abortion in their own case.
[2] They can recognize the right as belonging to legitimate law and
therefore [3] do not resist it with force. [41 To do that would be
unreasonable: it would mean their attempting to impose their own
comprehensive doctrine, which a majority of other citizens who follow
public reason do not accept. 62
None of these four claims is reasonable. Claim [1] reveals the negligence which
passes itself off as public reason on Rawls's side of the debate. The anti-
abortion citizens are claiming, with some good arguments, that abortion is rather
like slave-owning: a radical, basic injustice imposed on people deprived of the
protections of citizenship. The response, "You free citizens need not exercise the
59. Id. at 14-15.
60. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 8, at 244 n.32.
61. Moreover, the fact that the three-step Thomson-Rawls argument is "clearly cast in the form
of public reason" does not entail that it is reasonable: "[W]hether it is itself reasonable or not...
is another matter. As with any form of reasoning in public reason, the reasoning may be fallacious
or mistaken," id. at lvi n.32, in relation to an argument attributed to "Cardinal Bemadin." Step (3)
of the Thomson argument equivocates on "are unreasonable."
62. Id. at lvi-lvii; see also Rawls, Public Reason, supra note 43, at 787 n.57, 798-99.
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right to [own slaves] [abort your children] in your own case, so you can and
must recognize our law as legitimate as it applies to the rest of us," seems to me
derisory.
Claim [2] assumes that "the majority principle" is binding even when the
majority authorize gross injustice, and even when they do so without attempting
to show that it is consistent with the principle or criterion of reciprocity. Does
anyone believe that Rawls himself accepts this assumption in relation to
injustices which engage his sympathies?
Claim [3] switches without warning into the descriptive mode. The
interesting question, however, is whether there is good reason not to defy the
law which penalizes the use of reasonable force to rescue the unborn from their
killers. I can think of only one plausible reason to exclude such defiance as a
conscientious option for those whose vocations are consistent with such an
undertaking: that to attempt forcible rescue would generally, in present
conditions, be to launch a civil war. That resultant in itself does not settle the
argument. But (as I indicated above, in my remarks about the liberalism of
fear) a condition for justly launching war is that one have some prospect of
winning it, and that condition is not, in present circumstances, satisfied.
Claim [4] again depends on an arbitrary and unwarranted premise: that
those who enforce their view that a newborn baby must be treated as equal to
adults in basic rights (or who imprison pedophiles) are not imposing their own
"comprehensive doctrine," whereas those who insist that the baby a day before
birth is entitled to the same forcible protection are. Of course, this sort of
selective inattention to the strongly substantive and controversial character of
self-styled liberal theories is very characteristic of such theories; we see it, for
example, in the claim that "the right of a woman to control her body" is
"undisputed" (and therefore trumps the disputed right of the unborn child to
live) when in reality the alleged right of the woman is manifestly disputed and
was never accepted by any state until the Supreme Court overthrew the abortion
laws of every state (and indeed it is not a right accepted even by the Supreme
Court to this day). This sort of inattention often leads to outright self-
contradiction, as when people say that arguments about the use of public force
must never appeal to what has intrinsic value, but only to what people
subjectively prefer, and then offer to justify this "principle of subjective
preference" by arguing that self-governance is intrinsically valuable and/or is a
necessary condition of a good-i.e., an intrinsically valuable-life!
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V. PUBLIC REASON AND ABORTION
The public "public reason" of the United States (and other such nations)
presents, as I have said, an extraordinary spectacle: blank refusal to state any
reason justifying the dramatic, radical, total difference in the moral and legal
status of the baby inside and the baby outside the womb-the same baby on
perhaps the same day. The wider "public reason" which includes the
philosophers and others who offer to guide public deliberation on the abortion
question presents a different but analogous spectacle. There is an immense
literature claiming to justify the right to abortion, i.e. (we recall), the right to
expel the fetus with intent to kill it. But this has two striking features. First,
there is in this pro-abortion literature no consensus on the nature of the unborn
child, nor on the question of when the conceptus becomes human or a person
or otherwise entitled to a right to life, nor on any other major metaphysical or
moral question involved. There is no "overlapping consensus" except in the
result: women are to have some opportunity to destroy their unborn children.
And second, there is almost complete inattention to the substantial scholarly
literature presenting the opposing position,63 a consensus which denies the
abortion right on the basis that the conceptus has the nature and rights of a
human person from conception. 6'
The silence of public "public reason" about the justification for denying to
the unborn the basic equality rights acknowledged in the newly-born is easy to
explain. The prospects for producing such a justification are faint indeed. For
any such justification will have to have abandoned the one real basis of human
equality and equality rights: namely, the fact that each living human being
possesses, actually and not merely potentially, the radical capacity to reason,
laugh, love, repent, and choose as this unique, personal individual, a capacity
which is not some abstract characteristic of a species, but rather consists in the
unique, individual, organic functioning of the organism which comes into
existence as a new substance at the conception of that human being and subsists
until his or her death whether ninety minutes, ninety days, or ninety years
later-a capacity, individuality and personhood which subsists as real and
precious even while its operations come and go with many changing factors such
as immaturity, injury, sleep, and senility. Human beings are not just "values,"
63. Two good examples: GERMAIN G. GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND
THE ARGUMENTS (1970); PATRICK LEE, ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE (1996). See also
Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 YALE
L.J. 2475 (1997).
64. The asymmetry is far-reaching. Scholars opposing the abortion right labor through the
myriad confused and diverse arguments for abortion (or abortion and infanticide) rights, and publish
careful, well-documented critiques. Scholars favoring abortion (or abortion and a right to
infanticide) seem for the most part to invent the positions they offer to refute, and display little or
in most cases no awareness of the arguments actually advanced by defenders of the unborn.
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as Reiman imagines when asking why we do not think the number of people
should be maximized; rather, they are persons each incommunicably, non-
fungibly individual in this peculiar, deep way, and so entitled, one by one, to.
be respected.
(Is belief in the reality and value of personhood, understood in the way that
I have just summarized, to be called "religious"? It is rather a belief that results
from a close attention to the solidity and depth of this universe and its various
constituents, the kind of close attention which is the cause of religious
beliefs-and also of good science-rather than a mere resultant of them.)
Once one has decided not to base equality rights on the real personhood
which is istantiated in the unborn as well as the born, one will be reduced to
grounding them on some factor which is not coextensive with membership of the
human race and which is lacked by newborns, infants, and some mentally
handicapped persons. But drawing the circle around (say) sane adults and non-
infant children, on the basis that they have self-awareness and concern for self,
will then prove as groundless as drawing it around all and only the born.
Reiman's efforts to work with self-awareness and self-concern as the basis for
a right to life make this fragility manifest. (I leave to one side his half-hearted
effort to show that there is some reason for "protecting infants' lives" even
though no infant-on Reiman's account-has any right to life, deserves to live,
or is worthy of our respect.)' For if my right to be respected (that is, to be
counted in the reciprocity criterion; not killed; etc.) depends upon my being
aware of and concerned to continue my existence, why should I not be killed
suddenly and without warning? Reiman responds that "the loss to an aware
individual of the life whose continuation she is counting on, is a loss. . . that
remains a loss, a frustration of an individual's expectations . . . . 66 But this
will not do. If a sleeping individual is killed without warning, there is at no
time any individual with frustrated expectations, and at no time any individual
suffering from a loss. Searching around for an entity which undergoes this loss
and frustration, Reiman doubles up the entities in play:
Once a human being has begun to be aware of her life, that life
unfolds before a kind of inner audience that has an expectation of its
continuation, an affective stake in living on. This expectation persists
until the audience shuts down for good-even if, before that, the
audience dozes off from time to time. We defeat this expectation even
65. Reiman offers to explain why "we" think it is wrong to kill infants, but has nothing to say
which could show the immorality of the attitudes of someone who does not "love infants" (but only
perhaps two or three infants) and thinks it is not wrong to kill infants (at least infants not loved in
particular by anybody particular). REIMAN, supra note 1, at 202-03.
66. Id. at 197.
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if we kill a temporarily sleeping or comatose individual who has begun
to be aware of her life.67
But this doubling up gets Reiman nowhere. When the sleeping individual is
killed without warning, the alleged audience, too, is simultaneously "shut down
for good." So the plain fact remains that there is never anyone (actor or
audience) of whom we can rightly say "this individual has some defeated
expectations." Reiman is just equivocating' on "defeated expectations"; when
someone has them, they are a cause or kind of misery and often the resultant
subject-matter of injustice. Looking at the expectations, as Reiman invites us
to do, we can see that, in the case I am considering, there never are any
defeated expectations. First, there are X's undefeated expectations, and then,
a moment later and forever after, nothing in the way of expectations, defeated
or undefeated. There is no change in X's subjective awareness; as happens with
modem anaesthesia, that awareness simply ceases, without any awareness of its
cessation.
Reiman's entire discussion of the unborn and the early infant is, then, a
timely warning that the right to life, respect, justice, and equality loses its
intelligibility and its rational claim on conscientious deliberations and choices,
once it is uprooted from the foundations which were everywhere acknowledged
as a matter of public reason until the unprincipled will to private power
("subjective preference," "choice") closed down public reason on the abortion
question.
VI. PUBLIC REASON AND CLONING
When we turn to the question of making people by cloning, we can see that
the will to private power, which may well eventually close down public reason
if not headed off at the pass, is the will of the research scientist, of the dealers
in marketable new commodities, and of potential parents. Or rather of the
quasi-parental donors of the body cells with which new human beings may, it
now seems, be able to be brought into being without using even the sex cells,
let alone the sexual act, of any man or woman. Cloning, as Paul Ramsey
pointed out a generation ago, is a matter of asexual reproduction; biologically
speaking, the fact that it is copying is only an implication of that fact. In the
technique used to produce Dolly the sheep, the husk of a female sex cell was
used, plus the body cell of another sheep; but male sexuality has simply
disappeared from the production process, except insofar as it was involved some
time in the pre-cloning past, in the procreation (that is, the sexual generation)
67. Id. at 198.
68. This is not the occasion to deal with the other arguments in his chapter, but I should say
that many of them seem to me to fail by equivocation.
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of the donor (or some ancestor of the donor) of the now-to-be-cloned body cell.
The human being produced by cloning is a twin-a "delayed genetic twin"-of
the quasi-parent (donor) whose body cell has been used to produce the clone.
The child-the embryo-thus produced will be, of course, a fully human
being, as incommunicably unique a person as any ordinary twin or, indeed, as
any other person. But the circumstances of his or her generation by production
will dramatize something already to be found, if less dramatically, in all
generation of children by in vitro fertilization (IVF).' This feature of the
generation of children by IVF was identified with care by the lay philosophers
who carried out the analysis' which, along with two other quite different
though complementary analyses, was adopted by the Catholic Church and
appears more than once at the heart of the Church's judgment, articulated in the
document Donum Vitae in 1987, that generating children by IVF is always
wrong even in the more or less mythical "ideal case" where their life is
guaranteed against the quality-control in fact practiced by IVF technicians.
Germain Grisez gives a short, philosophical account of this analysis in his
great work on moral theology:
What exactly is the act of in vitro fertilization? It is not an act of
sexual intercourse open to new life but a technological act resulting,
when successful, in the production of a new human individual. It
precisely aims at supplying someone with a baby by bringing a
possible baby into being, and the choice of in vitro fertilization
precisely is to (try to) produce a baby by this procedure. So, to
choose to bring about conception in this fashion inevitably is to will
the baby's initial status as a product.
How do moral principles apply to this act? Products as such are
assigned their meaning and value by the human makers who produce
them and the consumers who use them, and so the status of any
product as such is subpersonal; . . . . This initial relationship, of
those who choose to produce babies with the babies they produce, is
inconsistent with, and so impedes, the communion which is
appropriate in any relationship among persons touching on their basic
goods.7
69. PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 64 (1970).
70. See Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee on Bio-Ethical Issues, In Vitro Fertilisation and
Public Policy (London, Catholic Information Services, May 1983) (evidence submitted to the
Government Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology).
71. 2 GERMAIN G. GRISEZ, LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 267 (1993).
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At this point, Grisez quotes some relevant sentences from Donum Vitae which
conclude: "Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity
and equality that must be common to parents and children."'
Grisez then continues his philosophical reflection:
Of course, those who choose to produce a baby make that choice
only insofar as it is a means to an ulterior end. They may well intend
that the baby be received in an authentic child-parent relationship, in
which he or she will live in the communion befitting those who share
personal dignity. If realized, this intended end will be good for the
baby as well as for the parents. But, even so, the choice to produce
the baby is the choice of a bad means to a good end, because the
baby's initial status as a product is subpersonal. The significance of
this status is most clear when the laboratory's defective products are
discarded and its surplus products used for lethal experiments.Y
3
In his evidence to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission on Cloning
Human Beings, Gilbert Meilaender deployed essentially the same argument in
relation to this new, still partly hypothetical way of generating human persons
technologically:
[Wihatever we say of [other reproductive technologies], surely
human cloning would be a new and decisive turn on this road. Far
more emphatically a kind of production. Far less a surrender to the
mystery of the genetic lottery which is the mystery of the child who
replicates neither Father nor Mother but incarnates their union. Far
more an understanding of the child as a product of human will.74
The Commission's report notes that Meilaender made it clear to them that he
"would have gotten off the train" of reproductive technology long before it
reached cloning.7' And surely rightly. The issue-which Meilaender and
others elaborated to the Commission with more richness and subtlety than I can
here convey-is at bottom the same, I have argued elsewhere, as that involved
in even the most benevolent and beneficent forms of slavery.
72. Id. (quoting CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT
FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION (Donum Vitae) Pt. H1. B.5
(1987)).
73. 2 GRISEZ, supra note 71, at 267-68.
74. NATIONAL BIOTErHics ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHiCS ADVISORY COMMISSION 76 (1997) (quoting
Meilaender's testimony to the Commission on Mar. 13, 1997).
75. Id. at 52.
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It is the issue of equality in dignity-an equality compromised in these
technological choices and procedures much more subtly, of course, than in the
barbarism of death-intending abortions, but compromised and violated
nonetheless. As the unborn child has a right not to be made the object of such
an intention to kill, so it has the right not to have been conceived, brought into
being, as a product. The right avails, in moral truth if not in positive law and
practice, whether the technique is straightforward IVF, or the cloning of
embryos by "twin fission," or the cloning of adult sources by the envisaged
procedures which aroused the President to appoint a Commission whose report
deals only with this last kind of procedure and therefore leaves the nettle of
principle ungrasped.
The right to equality in being brought into life, and the right to equality in
the face of the threat of being killed, are of course one and the same right in
two applications. And the applications come together, and the right is doubly
violated, in the practice of experimenting lethally on test-tube babies, whether
for the purpose of perfecting existing IVF techniques, or for discoveries in
.pure science," or for bringing into being and beginning to perfect a new
technique such as cloning from the cells of more or less grown-up human
beings. All are violations of the principle of reciprocity which lies near the
foundations of a comprehensively reasonable political public reason.
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